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COMMENTS
IS IT A SALE OR A LEASE?: THE IMPLICATIONS OF ARTICLE 2A
AND REVISED U.C.C. SECTION 1-201(37) IN NORTH CAROLINA
I. INTRODUCTION - WHAT IS ARTICLE 2A OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE?
Article 2A is the new Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter refer-
enced as "UCC") section on personal property leasing transactions. The
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws approved this new article and several corre-
sponding amendments to Articles I and 9 in the early part of 1987.,
Probably the most significant amendment to Article I was the change
made to the definition of "security interest" in UCC section 1-201(37).
Since the earlier version of section 1-201(37) had attempted to distin-
guish a security interest from a lease, the adoption of a new Article on
personal property leases obviously required some amendment to the old
definition of security interest.
Article 2A, which has five parts, contains' sections on: (1) the forma-
tion and construction of the lease contract; (2) the effect of the lease con-
tract on the lessee, lessor and creditors; (3) the performance of the lease
contact, including repudiation, substitution and excuse; and (4) default
by either the lessor or lessee and the appropriate remedies that will at-
tach thereafter. This "comprehensive" treatment of personal property
leases is a major change from the existing law, where "[l]eases of goods
[were] almost ignored" by the UCC.2 "Under present law, transactions
of this type are governed partly by common law principles relating to
personal property, partly by principles relating to real estate leases, and
partly by reference to Articles 2 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
dealing with Sales and Secured Transactions respectively."' 3 "Although
several portions of the Code have been amended, Article 2A is important
because it represents the first successful effort to bring another body of
1. Boss, The History of Article 2A: A Lesson for Practitioner and Scholar Alike, 39 ALA. L.
REV. 575, 594 (1988).
2. COVINGTON, The UCC has a New Article, NCBA NOTES BEARING INTEREST, v. 7, no. 4,
(Dec. 1987).
3. HAZARD, Foreword to U.C.C. Article 2A; 1987 Official Text of the UCC, compiled by
Douglas G. Baird, COMMERCIAL AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW: SELECTED STATUTES 1988 EDI-
TION at 189 (Westbury, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1988).
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commercial law within the scope of the UCC."4
Article 2A is also significant because it offers new uniform law to deal
with an increasingly popular business format, the personal property leas-
ing transaction. "The American Association of Equipment Lessors has
reported that the worldwide leasing business grew from 100 billion dol-
lars to 150 billion dollars in outstanding contracts in a span of only three
years, from 1976 to 1979, and projected that by 1985 the figure would be
200 billion dollars worldwide."' In the United States, "[t]he volume of
new equipment leases ... rose steadily from 43.5 billion dollars in 1980
to an estimated 74.4 billion dollars in 1984" and "[tioday, approximately
twenty percent of all capital investment in the United States is directly
attributable to equipment leasing, with over 310 billion dollars in lease
receivables currently outstanding."'6 Since the number of and dollar
amount involved with personal property leasing transactions continue to
grow, statutory treatment of this transaction should be considered by all
state legislatures. Several states have adopted and/or considered Article
2A,7 and numerous authorities have praised the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Insti-
tute's attempt to codify the law on personal property leases.8
These authorities also have started to interpret and criticize proposed
Article 2A and the additional changes to the UCC that were made with
the adoption of Article 2A. The state of North Carolina has preliminarily
started this process, 9 but further review is necessary. One of the primary
issues that must be discussed prior to the enactment of Article 2A in any
4. ALCES, Surreptitious and Not-So-Surreptitious Adjustment of the UCC An Introductory Es-
say, 39 ALA. L. REV. 559, 560 (1988) (footnotes omitted). Professor Alces points out that the UCC
has been amended, but no new provisions were added before the adoption of Article 2A. id. at 560,
n. 4. For additional historical information on the UCC, see Boss, supra note 1.
5. Boss, supra note 1, at 577 (citations omitted).
6. Id. at 576-77 (citations omitted).
7. Article 2A has been adopted by Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2A-101 et seq. (1988),
and by California, Cal. Code § 10101 et seq. (Deering 1988). However, the California statute will
not be effective until January 1, 1990. Similarly, the South Dakota legislature has recently adopted
Article 2A, but will not make it effective until January 1, 1990. Telephone interview with Amelia H.
Boss, author of Boss, supra note 1, and attorney with McCarter & English, Cherry Hill, N.J., (Apr. 3
1989). Article 2A has also been introduced into the legislatures of Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Washington, Colorado, Illinois, Rhode Island and Utah Boss supra
note 1 at 599 n 89. Lawmakers in Delaware have introduced the proposed statute to their legislature
as well. HUDDLESON, Old Wine in New Bottles: UCC Article 2A - Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV. 615,
618, n 5 (1988). In North Carolina, the North Carolina Bar Association UCC/Consumer Credit
Committee has recently considered Article 2A for North Carolina. COVINGTON, supra note 2, at 9.
8. Boss, supra note 1; Alces, supra note 4; HUDDLESON, supra note 7; HARRIS, The Rights of
Creditors Under Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REV. 803 (1988); RAPSON, Deficiencies and Ambiguities in
Lessors' Remedies Under Article 2A: Using Official Comments to Cure Problems in the Statute, 39
ALA. L. REV. 875 (1988); BENFIELD, Lessor's Damages Under Article 2A After Default by the Lessee
as to Accepted Goods, 39 ALA. L. REV. 915 (1988); and MILLER, Leases of Goods in Oklahoma: The
New Rules, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 417 (1988).
9. COVINGTON, supra note 2, at 9.
2
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [1989], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol18/iss2/5
U C.C. ARTICLE 2A
state is the changes made to section 1-201(37). This will be the focus of
my study. The specific provisions of Article 2A are worthy of extensive
review, but if the contract is considered a sale rather than a lease, Article
2A will not apply. One cannot determine whether the personal property
transaction is a sale or lease without consulting UCC section 1-201(37) in
North Carolina; therefore, a review of the old and new definitions of se-
curity interest in section 1-201(37) as well as the voluminous case law
that has arisen around the old definition represents a good beginning for
any discussion of proposed Article 2A.
II. WHAT CHANGES WERE MADE IN UCC SECTION 1-201(37)?
The older version of UCC section 1-201(37), which was adopted verba-
tim in North Carolina and is still in effect, says that
"Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures
which secures payment or performance of an obligation .... Unless a
lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title thereun-
der is not a "security interest" ..... Whether a lease is intended as secur-
ity is to be determined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the
inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one
intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with
the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become
the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nomi-
nal consideration does make the lease one intended for security.10
This statute attempts to distinguish between two types of leases: (1) true
leases and (2) leases which are actually security interests. A lease can be
considered a security interest because, under section 9-102(1)(a), Article
9 of the UCC applies "to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is
intended to create a security interest in personal property . .. ." If the
lease is a security interest, problems can arise for the lessor/creditor. One
of the main problems occurs when the lessee/debtor files bankruptcy and
the lessor/creditor attempts to reclaim the property free of any interest in
the debtor. Obviously, the trustee in bankruptcy and other third party
creditors will object to this reclamation when the lease actually looks as
much like a secured sale as a lease. Lessors are at a great disadvantage if
they have not filed a financing statement and the court decides that the
lease is actually a security interest. In this case the security interest is
unperfected and will consequently lack priority.
The old section 1-201(37) definition tries to resolve this conflict be-
tween a sale and a lease with four basic comments:
(1) For a lease to be a security interest, the parties must "intend" for
the lease to be a security interest;
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-201(37) (1988).
11. N.C. GEN. STATr. § 25-9-102(l)(2) (1988).
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(2) The intention of the parties will be determined by the facts of each
case;
(3) The mere fact that the lease includes an option to purchase does not
make the lease a security interest; and
(4) If the lease permits the lessee to purchase the property for nominal
or no additional consideration, the lease will be considered one for
security.
These comments have been little help to the attorneys practicing com-
mercial law and the courts resolving issues regarding the sale/lease dis-
tinction. The problems that this definition has created are numerous.
First, the lack of "detail" in this attempt to distinguish between a secur-
ity interest and a lease, "and the notion that they are, in fact, different
from one another," is simply confusing.1 2 Second, the definition in sec-
tion 1-201(37) is
imperfect ... [because] it fails to eliminate areas of uncertainty, [includ-
ing] (1) when the lease term substantially equals the expected useful life
of the property, and (2) when there is a "full pay-out lease" (i.e., when
the rent reserved is substantially equal to the cash price of the chattel
plus an amount equivalent to interest until the price will be paid as
rent). 13
Third, the court's focus on the party's intention "has resulted in a 'laun-
dry list' of considerations repeatedly cited as indications of an intention
that a lease is a secured transaction;"' 4 furthermore, "[t]he application of
any standard based on the intent of the parties, even with the best supple-
mental guidelines, is likely to be troublesome." 5 Frequent complaints
like this led to the adoption of a revised section 1-201(37).
The new section 1-201(37) is significantly more detailed than the ear-
lier version. In regard to leases, the new section 1-201(37) states that
Whether a transaction creates a lease or security interest is determined
by the facts of each case; however, a transaction creates a security inter-
est if the consideration the lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to
possession and use of the goods is an obligation for the term of the lease
not subject to termination by the lessee, and
(a) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the re-
maining economic life of the goods,
(b) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic
life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of the goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining eco-
nomic life of the goods for no additional consideration or nominal addi-
tional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement, or
12. AYER, On the Vacuity of the Sale/Lease Distinction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 667, 669 (1983).
13. KRIPKE, Some Dissonant Notes About Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REV. 791, 797-98 (1988).
14. MOONEY, Personal Property Leasing. A Challenge, 36 Bus. LAW. 1605, 1612 (1981).
15. COOGAN, Leases of Equipment and Some Other Unconventional Security Devices: An Analy-
sis of UCC Section 1-201(37) and Article 9, 1973 DUKE L. J. 909, 916 (1973).
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(d) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no
additional consideration or nominal additional consideration upon com-
pliance with the lease agreement.
A transaction does not create a security interest merely because it pro-
vides that
(a) the present value of the consideration the lessee is obligated to
pay the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is substan-
tially equal to or is greater than the fair market value of the goods at the
time the lease is entered into,
(b) the lessee assumes risk of loss of the goods, or agrees to pay taxes,
insurance, filing, recording, or registration fees, or service or maintenance
costs with respect to the goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease or to become the owner
of the goods,
(d) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for a fixed rent that is
equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market rent for
the use of the goods for the term of the renewal at the time the option is
to be performed, or
(e) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for a
fixed price that is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair
market value of the goods at the time the option is to be performed.
For purposes of this subsection (37):
(x) Additional consideration is not nominal (i) when the option to
renew the lease is granted to the lessee the rent is stated to be the fair
market rent for the use of the goods for the term of the renewal deter-
mined at the time the option is to be performed, or (ii) when the option to
become the owner of the goods is granted to the lessee the price is stated
to be the fair market value of the goods determined at the time the option
is to be performed. Additional consideration is nominal if it is less than
the lessee's reasonably predictable cost of performing under the lease
agreement if the option is not exercised;
(y) "Reasonably predictable" and "remaining economic life of the
goods" are to be determined with reference to the facts and circum-
stances at the time the transaction is entered into; and
(z) "Present value" means the amount as of a date certain of one or
more sums payable in the future, discounted to the date certain. The dis-
count is determined by the interest rate specified by the parties if the rate
is not manifestly unreasonable at the time the transaction is entered into;
otherwise, the discount is determined by a commercially reasonable rate
that takes into account the facts and circumstances of each case at the
time the transaction was entered into.
1 6
Although new section 1-201 (37) will not resolve every issue regarding
the sale/lease distinction, some would argue that it "represents the best
thinking of many lawyers and scholars who are familiar not only with the
16. UCC § 1-201 (37) (1987).
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cases ... but also with the current practices."'' 7
Other than the increased detail, the most noticeable change in section
1-201 (37) is the deletion of "all reference to the 'parties' intent."' 8 The
drafters of new section 1-201(37) recognized that "[r]eference to the in-
tent of the parties to create a lease or security interest ha[d] led to unfor-
tunate results;"' 9 furthermore, the Official Comments state that "[i]n
discovering intent [under the old version of section 1-201 (37)], courts
have relied upon factors that were thought to be more consistent with
sales or loans."20 These factors developed into the laundry list discussed
above;2' however, "[m]ost of these criteria ... are as applicable to true
leases as to security interests. '22 Wisely, the drafters of amended section
1-201(37) eliminated the reference to "intent" with the hopes of termi-
nating the use of the laundry list of factors and the unfortunate results"
the factors caused.
Instead of a somewhat arbitrary laundry list, new section 1-201 (37)
creates an improved schedule of guiding principles. Initially, the statute
says that "the facts of each case" will be determinative, which reminds
the reader that the drafters did not intend to create an "overly rigid defi-
nition woodenly resolving every imaginable case."' 23 Thereafter, the stat-
ute shows that there are "four red flags" to look for when trying to
determine if a lease is actually a security interest.24 If any one of the "red
flags" exists, the lease is a security interest.
These four red flags include an initial lease term substantially parallel to
the property's remaining economic life, a nominal option to renew the
lease for the property's remaining economic life, a nominal purchase op-
tion, and whether the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining
economic life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of the
goods.25
Furthermore, new section 1-201(37) offers the commercial law attorneys
and courts several helpful comments by defining when additional consid-
eration is or is not nominal and by stating that the "remaining economic
life of the goods" is "to be determined with reference to the facts and
circumstances at the time the transaction is entered into." By offering
"four red flags" to distinguish between a lease and a security interest,
some clarifying definitions, and a flexible factual premise, the drafters of
17. WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (3d ed. 1988).
18. UCC § 1-201 (37) Official Comment, (1987).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. MOONEY, supra note 14, at 1612 and the official comment accompanying text.
22. UCC § 1-201 (37), Official Comment (1987).
23. HUDDLESON, supra note 7 at 626.
24. BURNS, Uniform Commercial Code, Public Filing and Personal Property Leases: Questions
of Definition and Doctrine, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 425, 477 (1987).
25. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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new section 1-201 (37) have drastically improved the definition of "secur-
ity interest" in the UCC.
To further eradicate some of the ambiguities that existed under old
section 1-201(37), the drafters stated that the mere inclusion of any one
of five different factors would not make the lease a security interest.
These five factors were sometimes included in the laundry list as determi-
native of a security interest. The factors include a clarification of the ef-
fect of options and the present value of the option on the sale/lease
determination and the effect of the lessee agreeing to take certain risks
and obligations in the lease on the sale/lease determination. Addition-
ally, amended section 1-201 (37) includes a definition of "present value"
and a comment stating that the term "reasonably predictable" is "to be
determined with reference to the facts and circumstances at the time the
transaction is entered into," which provides some additional guidelines
to use when reviewing these five factors. These factors and their defini-
tional aids further help deter the problematical laundry list approach.
Furthermore, the definition of "security interest" in new section 1-201
(37) should be analyzed with reference to the definition of "lease" in sec-
tion 2A-103 (1) (j), where the statute says that a " '[1]ease' means a trans-
fer of the right to possession and use of goods for a term in return for
consideration, but a sale, including a sale on approval or a sale or return,
or retention or creation of a security interest is not a lease." This defini-
tion of "lease" attempts to define a lease by referring to the definitions of
"sale" in section 2-106 (1) and "security interest" in section 1-201 (37).
The definition of "security interest" in new section 1-201 (37) reflects the
"old common law touchstone of a true lease - the lessor's meaningful
residual interest."'26 "[B]y elaborating upon common-law principles in
the amendment to section 1-201 (37), sharpening the distinction between
a lease and a sale, the new statute provides significantly more guidance
than current law as to the essence of a true lease."
27
In sum, amended section 1-201 (37) is a great improvement over its
predecessor. "The draftsmen have correctly focused on the meaningful
residual analysis as their underlying premise in drawing the security in-
terest line of demarcation; ' 2 furthermore, the expanded definition of
''security interest" provides some necessary guidelines that did not exist
under the old definition. The drafters noticed the significant problems
that existed under the old version of section 1-201 (37) and tried to solve
the problems with clear and defined language.
26. HUDDLESON, supra note 7, at 626; See BURNS, supra note 22, at 476-77.
27. HUDDLESON, supra note 7, at 626. However, in a footnote to this quote, Huddleson points
out that the comments to the new UCC § 1-201 (37) say that "[a]n examination of the common law
will not provide an adequate answer to the question of what is a lease." See id. at 626, n. 27.
28. BURNS, supra note 24, at 477.
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The statute reflects a sincere effort to. review and understand the volu-
minous case law that arose on the issue: Is it a sale or a lease? The old
and new definition of "security interest" cannot be fully understood with-
out a review of this case law; therefore, one must move forward to the
cases in order to truly determine if amended section 1-201 (37), and its
founding father, Article 2A, are worthy of adoption in North Carolina.
III. THE CASE LAW OF JURISDICTIONS OTHER THAN
NORTH CAROLINA
A. The "Laundry List" Cases
Since the appellate courts in North Carolina have had few opportuni-
ties to distinguish a sale from a lease, the problems inherent in the old
version of section 1-201 (37) are easier to show through a review of the
case law in other jurisdictions. The cases in other jurisdictions clearly
show that the focus on a "laundry list" of factors to determine the par-
ties' intent can be arbitrary and confusing. The new section 1-201 (37)
hopefully deletes this problem by refusing to include the parties' intent as
a factor in distinguishing a security interest from a lease.
One of the first cases to use a "laundry list" of factors was In the Mat-
ter of Brookside Drug Store, Inc. ,29 where Bankruptcy Judge Krechevsky
developed a list of sixteen factors to use when trying to determine
whether a lease agreement is a security interest. In Re Brookside Drug
Store, Inc., the lessor of two cash registers brought an action to reclaim
the leased property from a debtor who had filed a Chapter XI bank-
ruptcy proceeding. In determining that the lease was actually a security
agreement, Bankruptcy Judge Krechevsky began by noting that the par-
ties' intention would determine whether the lease was, in fact, a secur-
ity;30 furthermore, he said the "[d]etermination of whether or not a lease
is intended as security must be in accordance with the terms of the defini-
tion of a security interest found in UCC section 1-201 (37)."31 Based
upon his review of twelve cases,32 Bankruptcy Judge Krechevsky con-
cluded that
a combination of some of the following factors [could be used] to deter-
mine that the lease agreement provided for a hidden security interest: (1)
whether there was an option to purchase for a nominal sum, (2) whether
there was a provision in the lease granting the lessee an equity or prop-
erty interest in the equipment, (3) whether the nature of the lessor's busi-
ness was to act as a financing agency, (4) whether the lessee paid a sales
29. 3 Bankr. 120, 122-123 (D. Conn. 1980).
30. Id. at 121-122.
31. Id. (App. 1986); at 122 (citations omitted).
32. Id., at 122. Bankruptcy Judge Krechevsky cited twelve cases in footnote 2 that he used in
developing his sixteen factors for distinguishing a lease from a security interest.
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tax incident to acquisition of the equipment, (5) whether the lessee paid
all other taxes incident to ownership of the equipment, (6) whether the
lessee was responsible for comprehensive insurance on the equipment, (7)
whether the lessee was required to pay any and all license fees for opera-
tion of the equipment, and to maintain the equipment at his expense, (8)
whether the agreement placed the entire risk of loss upon the lessee, (9)
whether the agreement included a clause permitting the lessor to acceler-
ate the payment of rent upon default of the lessee and granted remedies
similar to those of a mortgagee, (10) whether the equipment subject to
the agreement was selected by the lessee and purchased by the lessor for
this specific lessee, (11) whether the lessee was required to pay a substan-
tial security deposit in order to obtain the equipment, (12) whether the
agreement required the lessee to join the lessor, or permit the lessor by
himself, to execute a UCC financing statement, (13) whether there was a
default provision in the lease inordinately favorable to the lessor, (14)
whether there was a provision in the lease for liquidated damages, (15)
whether there was a provision disclaiming warranties of fitness and/or
merchantability on the part of the lessor, (16) whether the aggregate rent-
als approximate the value or purchase price of the equipment.
3
Bankruptcy Judge Krechevsky applied these sixteen factors to the facts
and determined that a security interest, rather than a lease, had been
created. The Judge found that the lessee bore the responsibility of insur-
ance, risk of loss, maintenance, tax and license fees, and the lessor dis-
claimed all warranties, could accelerate upon default, and could file a
financing statement;3 4 therefore, the lessor was unable to reclaim the cash
registers because he had not perfected his security interest in accordance
with Article 9. Numerous courts have cited Brookside Drug Store as au-
thority for some or all of its sixteen factors.a5
B. The Problems with the "Laundry List" Approach
The factors applied by the court in Brookside Drug Store can help
show the existence of a disguised security interest. Other courts have ap-
plied similar factors to determine whether a lease is a security interest;3 6
however, these factors are less than perfect. Some of the indicia of a se-
curity interest are almost as common in leasing agreements as they are in
security agreements. For this reason, the courts are able to apply the
factors very often. Yet, this does not make the factors valid indicators of
33. Id. at 122-123.
34. Id. at 123.
35. In re Rex Group, Inc., 80 Bankr. 774, 779 (E.D. Va. 1987); In re Standard Fin. Manage-
ment Corp., 79 Bankr. 100, 101-102 (D. Mass. 1987); In re Mariner Communications, Inc., 76 Bankr.
242, 245 (D. Mass. 1987); In re P. W.L. Investments, 92 Bankr. 680, 684-85 (W.D. Tex. 1987); In re
Access Equipment, Inc., 62 Bankr. 642, 646-47 (D. Mass. 1986); In re Puckett, 60 Bankr. 223, 236-
240 (M.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Sprecher Bros. Livestock & Grain, Ltd., 58 Bankr. 408, 414 (D.S.D.
1986); and In re Catamount Dyers, Inc., 43 Bankr. 564, 567 (D. Vt. 1984).
36. See infra notes 37, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 49, 52 and 53.
9
Wood: Is It a Sale or a Lease: The Implications of Article 2A and Revis
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1989
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
a security interest. Nine of the factors applied in Brookside Drug Store
are particularly weak indicators of a security interest.
(1) Lessor as Financing Agency
37
Bankruptcy Judge Krechevsky's third factor, regarding "whether the
nature of the lessor's business was to act as a financing agency,"'38 is a
prime example of a factor that should not be used to determine whether a
lease is a security agreement. "The fact that the lessor is a financial insti-
tution should have no bearing on the nature of the underlying transac-
tion if it has corporate authority to engage in leasing."' 39 Simply because
the lessor uses more financing agreements than leasing agreements is no
reason to take his equity in the property away after the lessee has
breached the agreement.' If a financing institution offers a leasing ar-
rangement to a lessee/purchaser, the lessee/purchaser should become
suspicious and question why he is not being offered a sales agreement.
The failure to question the obvious distinction should not disadvantage
the lessor, especially since most of these cases deal with sophisticated
business parties. Lessors should not be penalized when they .occasionally
offer leasing options to their clientele.
(2) Who pays the taxes?41
Under constantly changing federal, state and local tax schemes, a les-
37. The courts that have applied or discussed this factor as helpful in distinguishing a sale from
a lease include: In Re Brookside Drug Store, Inc., 3 Bankr. 120 (D. Conn. 1980); In re Falk Farms
Inc., 88 Bankr. 254 (Bkrtcy. 9th Cir. 1988); In re Standard Financial Management Corp., 79 Bankr.
100 (D. Mass. 1987); In re Brown, 82 Bankr. 68 (W.D. Ark. 1987); In re Mariner Communications,
76 Bankr. 242 (D. Mass. 1987); Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Constr.
Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); In re Access Equip., Inc., 62 Bankr. 642 (D. Mass. 1986); In re
Puckett, 60 Bankr. 223 (M.D. Tenn. 1986); United Leaseshares, Inc. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co.,
470 N.E.2d 1383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); In re Catamount Dyers, Inc., 43 Bankr. 564 (D. Vt. 1984);
and In re Marhoefer Packing Co., Inc., 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982).
38. In re Brookside Drug Store, 3 Bankr. 120, 122 (D. Conn. 1980).
39. LEARY, The Procrustean Bed of Finance Leasing, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1073-74 (1981).
40. The author recognizes that a litigant taking this position may encounter problems with
UCC 1-205 (1987).
41. The courts that have applied or discussed this factor as helpful in distinguishing a sale from
a lease include: In re Brookside Drug Store, Inc., 3 Bankr. 120 (D. Conn. 1980); In re Baker, 91
Bankr. 426 (N.D. Ohio 1988); In re Falk Farms, Inc., 88 Bankr. 254 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Rex
Group, Inc., 80 Bankr. 774 (E.D. Va. 1987); In re Standard Fin. Management Corp., 79 Bankr. 100
(D. Mass. 1987); Morris v. Lyons Capitol Resources, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); In
re Triple B Oil Producers, Inc., 75 Bankr. 461 (S.D. Ill. 1987); In re Brown, 82 Bankr. 68 (W.D. Ark.
1987); In re Mariner Communications, 76 Bankr. 242 (D. Mass. 1987); In re P. W.L. Investments, 92
Bankr. 680 (W.D. Tex. 1987); In re Beker Indu& Corp., 69 Bankr. 937 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Colorado Leasing Corp. v. Borquez, 738 P.2d 377 (Colo. App. 1986); H.M.O. Systems, Inc. v.
Choicecare Health Services, 665 P.2d 635 (Colo. App. 1983); Lease Finance, Inc. v. Burger, 575
P.2d 857 (Colo. App. 1977); Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co.,
731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); In re Access Equip., Inc., 62 Bankr. 642 (D. Mass. 1986); Burton
Compressor Corp. v. Stateline Forest Products, 79 Or. App. 626, 720 P.2d 386 (1986); In re Puckett,
60 Bankr. 223 (M.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Sprecher Bros. Livestock & Grain, Ltd., 58 Bankr. 408 (D.
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sor may have numerous reasons for allocating some tax burdens upon a
lessee. The local, state and/or federal tax obligations placed upon a les-
sor in a given year can be somewhat complicated; therefore, the compli-
cations inherent in taxing make the decision of allocating the tax burden
upon the lessee instead of the lessor merely a matter of contract negotia-
tion. Both the lessor and the lessee may agree that it is best for both
parties when the lessee assumes a particular taxing obligation. By assum-
ing the taxing obligation, the lessee may be reducing his monthly rental.
Since the decision regarding who will pay the taxes is simply a matter of
contract negotiation, it should not be a factor in determining whether
the lease is a security agreement.
(3) Who pays insurance and accepts risk of loss?4 2
Similarly, a lessor and lessee may legitimately bargain over the insur-
ance and risk of loss obligations imposed upon one owning or leasing
personal property. "[R]isk of loss is an allocation by contract of the cost
of procuring insurance, and not an indicator of the nature of the transac-
tion."43 By contract, whether it is a leasing contract or a financing con-
tract, either party can agree to be responsible for risk of loss or for
insurance. If the lessee is responsible for either risk of loss or insurance,
the monthly payments or the monthly rentals are reduced; therefore, the
sixth and the eighth factors in Brookside Drug Store are weak factors for
determining the sale/lease distinction.
S.D. 1986); Mejia v. Citizens & Southern Bank, 175 Ga. App. 80, 332 S.E.2d 170 (1985); McEntire
v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. Ct. App 1984); United Leaseshares, Inc. v. Citizens
Bank & Trust Co., 470 N.E.2d 1383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); In re Catamount Dyers, Inc., 43 Bankr.
564 (D. Vt. 1984); and In re of Marhoefer Packing Co., Inc., 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982).
42. The courts that have applied or discussed this factor as helpful in distinguishing a sale from
a lease include: In re Brookside Drug Store, Inc., 3 Bankr. 120 (D. Conn. 1980); In re Baker, 91
Bankr. 426 (N.D. Ohio 1988); In re Falk Farms, Inc., 88 Bankr. 254 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Rex
Group, Inc., 80 Bankr. 774 (E.D. Va. 1987); In re Standard Fin. Management Corp., 79 Bankr. 100
(D. Mass. 1987); Morris v. Lyons Capitol Resources, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); In
re Triple B Oil Producers, Inc., 75 Bankr. 461 (S.D. Iil. 1987); In re Brown, 82 Bankr. 68 (W.D. Ark.
1987); In re Mariner Communications, 76 Bankr. 242 (D. Mass. 1987); In re P. W.L. Investments, 92
Bankr. 680 (W.D. Tex. 1987); In re Beker Induz Corp., 69 Bankr. 937 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Colorado Leasing Corp. v. Borquez, 738 P.2d 377 (Colo. App. 1986); H.M.O. Systems, Inc. V.
Choicecare Health Services, 665 P.2d 635 (Colo. App. 1983); Lease Finance, Inc. v. Burger, 575
P.2d 857 (Colo. App. 1977); Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co.,
731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); In re Huffman, 63 Bankr. 737 (N.D. Ga. 1986); In re Access Equip., Inc.,
62 Bankr. 642 (D. Mass. 1986); Burton Compressor Corp. v. Stateline Forest Products, 79 Or. App.
626, 720 P.2d 386 (1986); In re Puckett, 60 Bankr. 223 (M.D. Tenn. 1986); Mejia v. Citizens &
Southern Bank, 175 Ga. App. 80, 332 S.E.2d 170 (1985); McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471
N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); United Leaseshares, Inc. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 470
N.E.2d 1383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); In re Catamount Dyers, Inc., 43 Bankr. 564 (D. Vt. 1984); and In
re Marhoefer Packing Co., Inc., 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982).
43. LEARY, supra note 39, at 1072-73.
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(4) Licensing and Maintenance Fees'
Deciding who will be responsible for licensing and maintenance of the
property represents two further matters for contract negotiation. In
many situations, it will simply be more convenient for the lessee to pro-
cure the proper license for the personal property as well as maintain the
property; moreover, it seems only logical that the lessee have at least a
partial duty to maintain any property that he leases. As one commenta-
tor noted, placing the responsibility for maintenance upon the lessee "is a
cost allocation bargained for on the basis of efficiency and convenience,
not on whether the transaction is a lease or sale;" 45 therefore, if the lessee
agrees to pay for licensing and maintenance fees, the lessor should not
suffer upon lessee's default.
(5) Acceleration Clauses
46
The courts also use the existence of an acceleration clause as evidence
of a security agreement; however, the existence of an acceleration clause
does not adequately help distinguish a lease from a sale. In fact, real
property leasing agreements sometimes contain acceleration clauses, but
this does not make the real property leasing agreement a mortgage. The
ability to accelerate rental payments upon default protects the lessor and
does not create a disguised security agreement.
44. The courts that have applied or discussed this factor as helpful in distinguishing a sale from
a lease include: In re Brookside Drug Store, Inc., 3 Bankr. 120 (D. Conn. 1980); In re Baker, 91
Bankr. 426 (N.D. Ohio 1988); In re Rex Group, Inc., 80 Bankr. 774 (E.D. Va. 1987); In re Standard
Fin. Management Corp., 79 Bankr. 100 (D. Mass. 1987); In re Triple B Oil Producers, Inc., 75 Bankr.
461 (S.D. I11. 1987); In re Mariner Communications, 76 Bankr. 242 (D. Mass. 1987); In re Access
Equip., Inc., 62 Bankr. 642 (D. Mass. 1986); Burton Compressor Corp. v. Stateline Forest Products,
79 Or. App. 626, 720 P.2d 386 (1986); In re Puckett, 60 Bankr. 223 (M.D. Tenn. 1986); Mejia v.
Citizens & Southern Bank, 175 Ga. App. 80, 332 S.E.2d 170 (1985); United Leaseshares, Inc. v.
Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 470 N.E.2d 1383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); In re Catamount Dyers, Inc., 43
Bankr. 564 (D. Vt. 1984); and In re Marhoefer Packing Co., Inc., 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982).
45. LEARY, supra note 39, at 1073.
46. The courts that have applied or discussed this factor as helpful in distinguishing a sale from
a lease include: In re Brookside Drug Store, Inc., 3 Bankr. 120 (D. Conn. 1980); In re Falk Farms,
Inc., 88 Bankr. 254 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Rex Group, Inc., 80 Bankr. 774 (E.D. Va. 1987); In re
Standard Fin. Management Corp., 79 Bankr. 100 (D. Mass. 1987); In re Brown, 82 Bankr. 68 (W.D.
Ark. 1987); In re Mariner Communications, 76 Bankr. 242 (D. Mass. 1987); In re Beker Indus.
Corp., 69 Bankr. 937 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y. 1987); Colorado Leasing Corp. v. Borquez, 738 P.2d 377
(Colo. App. 1986); H.M.O. Systems, Inc. v. Choicecare Health Services, 665 P.2d 635 (Colo. App.
1983); Lease Finance, Inc. v. Burger, 575 P.2d 857 (Colo. App. 1977); Colonial Leasing Co. of New
England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); In re Access Equip., Inc., 62
Bankr. 642 (D. Mass. 1986); Burton Compressor Corp. v. Stateline Forest Products, 79 Or. App.
626, 720 P.2d 386 (1986); In re Sprecher Bros. Livestock & Grain, Ltd., 58 Bankr. 408 (D. S.D.
1986); McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); and In re Catamount
Dyers, Inc., 43 Bankr. 564 (D. Vt. 1984).
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [1989], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol18/iss2/5
UC. C ARTICLE 2A
(6) Who selected and purchased the property?47
Bankruptcy Judge Krechevsky states that his tenth factor to use when
distinguishing a sale from a lease as "whether the equipment subject to
the agreement was selected by the lessee and purchased by the lessor for
this specific lessee."'48  One can easily imagine a lessor agreeing to
purchase equipment for a particular lessee with the intention of selling
the used property at the end of the lease term to the highest bidder. The
application of this factor penalizes the lessor who is a prudent investor
and who is willing to purchase specific property, lease that property to a
specific party, and sell the property to the highest bidder at the end of the
lease term. This is an advantage of a leasing agreement over a sales
agreements, and a lessor should not automatically lose after choosing this
advantage of the leasing agreement.
(7) Security Deposits49
The eleventh factor of Bankruptcy Judge Krechevsky, regarding secur-
ity deposits, "is probably listed because of its resemblance to a 'down
payment' in a time-sales'transaction;" 5 however, "it is a very customary
provision in real estate leases." Similarly, the parties may agree to a
security deposit under a personal property lease to protect the lessor's
interest in the property or reduce the monthly leasing payments; there-
47. The courts that have applied or discussed this factor as helpful in distinguishing a sale from
a lease include: In re Brookside Drug Store, Inc., 3 Bankr. 120 (D. Conn. 1980); In re Falk Farms,
Inc., 88 Bankr. 254 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Rex Group, Inc., 80 Bankr. 774 (E.D. Va. 1987); In re
Standard Fin. Management Corp., 79 Bankr. 100 (D. Mass. 1987); Morris .v. Lyons Capitol
Resources, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); In re Mariner Communications, 76 Bankr.
242 (D. Mass. 1987); In re P. W.L. Investments, 92 Bankr. 680 (W.D. Tex. 1987); In re Beker Indus.
Corp., 69 Bankr. 937 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y. 1987); Colorado Leasing Corp. v. Borquez, 738 P.2d 377
(Colo. App. 1986); H.M.O. Systems, Inc. v. Choicecare Health Services, 665 P.2d 635 (Colo. App.
1983); Lease Finance, Inc. v. Burger, 575 P.2d 857 (Colo. App. 1977); Colonial Leasing Co. of New
England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); In re Access Equip., Inc., 62
Bankr. 642 (D. Mass. 1986); Burton Compressor Corp. v. Stateline Forest Products, 79 Or. App.
626, 720 P.2d 386 (1986); In re Puckett, 60 Bankr. 223 (M.D. Tenn. 1986); and McEntire v. Indiana
Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
48. In re Brookside Drug Store, Inc., 3 Bankr. at 123.
49. The courts that have applied or discussed this factor as helpful in distinguishing a sale from
a lease include: In re Brookside Drug Store. Inc., 3 Bankr. 120 (D. Conn. 1980); In re Baker, 91
Bankr. 426 (N.D. Ohio 1988); Woods v. General Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc., 369 S.E.2d 334,
187 Ga. App. 57 (1988); In re Standard Fin. Management Corp., 79 Bankr. 100 (D. Mass. 1987); In
re Mariner Communications, 76 Bankr. 242 (D. Mass. 1987); In re P. W.L. Investments, 92 Bankr.
680 (W.D. Tex. 1987); In re Beker Indus Corp., 69 Bankr. 937 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y. 1987); Colonial
Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); In re
Access Equip., Inc., 62 Bankr. 642 (D. Mass. 1986); In re Puckett, 60 Bankr. 223 (M.D. Tenn. 1986);
In re Sprecher Bros. Livestock & Grain, Ltd., 58 Bankr. 408 (D. S.D. 1986); and In re Catamount
Dyers, Inc., 43 Bankr. 564 (D. Vt. 1984).
50. LEARY, supra note 39, at 1075.
51. Id.
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fore, the existence of a security deposit should not indicate an intention
to create a security agreement.
(8) Was a UCC financing statement filed?52
Another example of problems created by Bankruptcy Judge Krechev-
sky's "laundry list" is found in his twelfth factor, where he said that the
filing of a UCC financing statement indicated an intention to create a
security agreement. UCC section 9-408, which permits a lessor to file a
financing statement, says "filing shall not of itself be a factor in determin-
ing whether or not the . . . lease is intended as security (Section 1-
201(37))." Section 9-408 shows the obvious weakness in Bankruptcy
Judge Krechevsky's twelfth factor and proves that this factor does not
reflect the true intent of the UCC.
(9) Disclaimer of Warranties
5 3
If a lessor and lessee agree that the lessor will disclaim all warranties
under the leasing agreement, the two parties are simply deciding a mat-
ter of contract negotiation. "A disclaimer by a lessor is only the shifting
of any potential losses to the supplier" and "[i]t offers no aid to classifi-
cation;"54 therefore, the existence of a disclaimer should not evidence an
intent to create a security interest.
In sum, there are numerous problem areas in the "laundry list" of
factors created by Bankruptcy Judge Krechevsky in Brookside Drug
Store and used by other courts in varying forms. These problems lead to
one simple conclusion: "Reference to the intent of the parties to create a
lease or security interest has led to unfortunate results." 5 The best way
52. The courts that have applied or discussed this factor as helpful in distinguishing a sale from
a lease include: In re Brookside Drug Store, Inc., 3 Bankr. 120 (D. Conn. 1980); Woods v. General
Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc., 369 S.E.2d 334, 187 Ga.App. 57 (1988); In re Standard Fin.
Management Corp., 79 Bankr. 100 (D. Mass. 1987); In re Brown, 82 Bankr. 68 (W.D. Ark. 1987); In
re Mariner Communications, 76 Bankr. 242 (D. Mass. 1987); In re P. W.L Investments, 92 Bankr.
680 (W.D. Tex. 1987); In re Access Equip., Inc., 62 Bankr. 642 (D. Mass. 1986); Mejia v. Citizens &
Southern Bank, 175 Ga. App. 80, 332 S.E.2d 170 (1985); and In re Catamount Dyers, Inc., 43 Bankr.
564 (D. Vt. 1984).
53. The courts that have applied or discussed this factor as helpful in distinguishing a sale from
a lease include: In re Brookside Drug Store, Inc., 3 Bankr. 120 (D. Conn. 1980); In re Rex Group,
Inc., 80 Bankr. 774 (E.D. Va. 1987); In re P. W.L. Investments, 92 Bankr. 680 (W.D. Tex. 1987);
Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986);
Colorado Leasing Corp. v. Borquez, 738 P.2d 377 (Colo. App. 1986) H.M.O. Systems, Inc. v.
Choicecare Health Services, 665 P.2d 635 (Colo. App. 1983); Lease Finance, Inc. v. Burger, 575
P.2d 857 (Colo. App. 1977); In re Standard Fin. Management Corp., 79 Bankr. 100 (D. Mass. 1987);
In re Mariner Communications, 76 Bankr. 242 (D. Mass. 1987); In re Access Equip., Inc., 62 Bankr.
642 (D. Mass. 1986); In re Puckett, 60 Bankr. 223 (M.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Sprecher Bro& Livestock
& Grain, Ltd., 58 Bankr. 408 (D. S.D. 1986); and In re Catamount Dyers, Inc., 43 Bankr. 564 (D. Vt.
1984).
54. LEARY, supra note 39, at 1074.
55. UCC § 1-201 (37) Official Comment (1988).
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to eliminate the problems is by "delet[ing] all reference to the parties'
intent" from the old version of section 1-201 (37).56 The drafters of
amended section 1-201(37) did this and have created a much more com-
prehensible and precise definition of "security interest." The new defini-
tion of "security interest" focuses on the "economics" of the facts rather
than the intent of the parties, which creates an improved definition."
For this reason and. others,58 the North -Carolina General Assembly
should strongly consider adopting Article 2A and amended section 1-201
(37) in the near future..
IV. THE CASE LAW OF NORTH CAROLINA
The North Carolina appellate courts have had few opportunities to
determine whether a particular transaction is a sale or a lease; however,
this is no reason to consider Article 2A and amended section 1-201 (37)
unimportant for North Carolina. If this state wants to expand its busi-
ness opportunities for the twety-first century, the Legislature must keep
the statutes as modern as possible. The attorneys will not want to rely
upon a mixture of common law principles, real estate leasing law doc-
trines, and rules from Articles 2 and 9,59 when a prospective business
client walks in the office and asks for advice on a personal property leas-
ing transaction. Likewise, no court will want to develop their own "laun-
dry list" of factors to use.' ° A "laundry list" test is too abstract and very
hard to apply.. By amending North Carolina General Statute section 25-
1-201 (37), the General Assembly can help the North Carolina courts
avoid many of the problems that'have occurred when courts in other
jurisdictions have attempted to distinguish a sale from a lease; further-
more, clarifying the sale/lease distinction is just one advantage of the
adoption of Article 2A. Article 2A also provides rules on the formation
and construction of the leasing contract, the effect of the leasing contract,
performance of the leasing contract, and default; therefore, the fact that
little North Carolina litigation has focused on the sale/lease distinction
should not prevent the General Assembly from seriously considering the
numerous advantages for adopting Article 2A and amended section 1-
201 (37).
The most recent case applying North Carolina General Statute Section
25-1-201 (37) to determine whether a transaction was a sale or a lease is
In re Boling.61 In Boling, the trustee and debtor in a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy proceeding brought an action contending that leases of four com-
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. This study is not intended to determine all the advantages of Article 2A of the UCC.
59. HAZARD, supra note 3, at 189.
60.. MOONEY, supra note 13, at 1612.
61. 13 Bankr. 39 (D. Tenn. 1981).
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mercial trailers were intended for security, rather than true leases, and
the lessor failed to perfect the security interest. The first three leases
were identical. In each, the lessee/debtor agreed to lease a 1979 Great
Dane trailer for a price of $680.87 per month for a period of 42 months.
A nonrefundable deposit of $2400.00 was required and the original cost
of each unit was estimated to be $24,000.00. The three leases gave the
lessee/debtor the option to purchase the trailers at the end of the lease
term for the "estimated Fair Market Value at the end of the Lease,"62
which was stated at $2400.00 in the leases. The fourth lease provided
for 36 monthly payments of $481.00 and a $1400.00 nonrefundable se-
curity deposit in return for the use of a 1974 Timpte Trailer. There was
also a purchase option in the fourth lease at the "estimated Fair Market
Value at the end of [the] Lease as determined by the Lessor," but the
lease did not state that value like the parties hatd stated in the first three
leases.63
In determining that these transactions were true leases rather than
leases intended for security, Bankruptcy Judge Bare began by noting that
"[g]enerally, the intention of the parties will determine the character of
the transaction."'  Regardless of the proper outcome of this case, herein
lies the primary reason that the North Carolina Legislature should con-
sider amended section 1-201 (37). By focusing on the party's intention,
the courts in North Carolina will develop the same "laundry list"
problems that exist in other jurisdictions. One of the primary purposes
of amending section 1-201 (37) was to eliminate the "unfortunate re-
sults" that occurred with the "[r]eference to the intent of the parties to
create a lease or security interest."' 65 Amending North Carolina General
Statute section 25-1-201 (37) would eliminate the focus on intent and the
problems caused by this focus.
Under the facts of Boling, Bankruptcy Judge Bare also had the oppor-
tunity to determine whether the consideration to purchase the trailers at
the end of the lease term was nominal under North Carolina General
Statute section 25-1-201 (37). He noted that
[flour tests have been used by courts in jurisdictions other than North
Carolina to determine whether consideration is nominal within the mean-
ing of section 1-201 (37). The first test requires a comparison of the op-
tion price and the market value of the property at the time the option is
exercised. The second is whether the option to purchase gives the lessee
"no sensible alternative" but to exercise the option. The third involves a
comparison of the option price and the original cost of the property. The
fourth involves a comparison of the option price and the total rentals
62. Id. at 41.
63. Id.
64. Id.. at 42.
65. UCC § 1-201 (37) Official Comment (37), at 21 (1988).
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required under the lease.66
The single fact that Bankruptcy Judge Bare was forced to review four
different tests to determine whether the consideration was nominal or
not shows an inherent problem in the old version of section 1-201 (37).
Although amended section 1-201 (37) would not eliminate all the tough
questions, it would have clarified the format within which Bankruptcy
Judge Bare could have made his determination.
After looking at these four tests, Bankruptcy Judge Bare said the "test
requiring a comparison of the option purchase price and the market
value at the time of purchase has been stated to be the 'best' test."' 67 He
thereafter "conclude[d] that the option price for the purchase of the three
Great Dane trailers at the end of the lease term for $2400.00 bears a
reasonable resemblance to the fair market price of the trailers;, 61 there-
fore, under the first and allegedly "best test," Bankruptcy Judge Bare
determined that these contracts were true leases;69 however, Bankruptcy
Judge Bare did reference the second test when he stated that "[w]hile it is
true that Boling may have no 'sensible alternative' other than to exercise
the option to purchase, the purchase price cannot be said to be 'nominal'
based upon a comparison of the purchase price with the value of the
trailers at the end of the lease period, and the intention of the parties.",
71
This comment points out two weaknesses in the old version of section 1-
201 (37). First, Bankruptcy Judge Bare had to refer to more than one
test in order to make and support his determination. Second, the refer-
ence to the party's intent shows a weakness of old section 1-201 (37)
previously discussed. These weaknesses in North Carolina General Stat-
ute section 25-1-201 (37) amplified by the court's dicta, as well as the
other problems discussed hereinabove, help show why the North Caro-
lina General Assembly should seriously consider adopting Article 2A
and amended section 1-201 (37).
In his opinion, Bankruptcy Judge Bare referenced three earlier North
Carolina cases which discussed the sale/lease distinction under North
Carolina General Statute section 25-1-201 (37).71 In reference to one of
these cases, Szabo Food Service, Inc., of North Carolina v. Balentine's,
66. 13 Bankr. at 43 (citing ANNOTATION, 76 A.L.R.3d 11, 19 (1977)).
67. Id. citing Peco, Inc. v. Hartbauer Tool & Die Co., 11 U.C.C. Rep. 383 (Ore.S.Ct. 1972).
68. Id. at 45.
69. In regard to the fourth lease for the Timpte trailer, Bankruptcy Judge Bare also concluded
that this was a true lease. He reasoned that the trailer would be purchased at the fair market value
since there was no purchase price actually furnished when the lease was executed. The agreement
lacked a purchase price because the trailer allegedly would have little or no value at the end of the
lease term. Id.
70. Id.
71. Szabo Food Service, Inc. of North Carolina v. Balentine's, Inc., 285 N.C. 452, 206 S.E.2d
242 (1974); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corat v. David, 32 N.C. App. at 559, 232 S.E.2d 867, disc. rev.
denied, 292 N.C. 640, 235 S.E.2d 61 (1977); NYTCO Leasing, Inc. v. Dan-Cleve Corp., 31 N.C.
App. at 634, 230 S.E.2d 559 (1976), disc. rev. denied, 292 N.C. 265, 233 S.E.2d 393 (1977).
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Inc.,72 Bankruptcy Judge Bare said "the North Carolina Supreme Court
examined a somewhat unusual transaction and held it to be a lease.""
The unusual facts of this case do not create any strong arguments for
amending North Carolina General Statute section 25-1-201 (37), but the
North Carolina Supreme Court's focus on the party's intention when de-
termining that the transaction was a lease again shows an inherent prob-
lem with the statute.
In Szabo Food Service, the lessor of restaurant equipment sought a de-
claratory judgment to determine whether the lessee or the lessor was re-
sponsible for listing and paying personal property taxes on the
equipment. In the lease, the lessor had agreed to pay these taxes; how-
ever, the lessee's testimony at trial indicated that if the lessee rented the
property for the entire lease period, he would thereafter own the prop-
erty. Lessor argued that the agreement was actually a conditional sale
rather than a lease under North Carolina General Statute section 25-1-
201 (37). Yet, the court held that the agreement was a true lease and the
lessor was responsible for the ad valorem taxes.
In holding that the agreement was a lease, the court in Szabo Food
Service said "[w]hether an agreement constitutes a conditional sale or a
contract of a different character is a question of the parties' intent as
shown by the language they employed." 74 Again, the focus on intent
creates the problem that the drafters of new section 1-201 (37) hope to
avoid." The court reviewed North Carolina General Statute section 25-
1-201 (37) and section 25-9-102, but found "the Official Comment to
section (a) of G.S. 25-9-102" particularly enlightening because of its fo-
cus on intent:
Except for sales of accounts, contract rights and chattel paper [the sub-
ject of section (b)] the principal test whether a transaction comes under
this Article is: Is the transaction intended to have effect as security? ...
Transactions in the form of consignments or leases are subject to this
Article if the understanding of the parties or the effect of the arrangement
shows that a security interest was intended .... When it is found that a
security interest as defined in Section 1-201 (37) was intended, this Arti-
cle applies regardless of the form of the transaction or the name by which
the parties may have christened it.
76
This focus on intent by the highest court in North Carolina leads to the
simple conclusion that North Carolina courts would encounter the same
problems of other jurisdictions had the appellate courts reviewed the
sale/lease issue on a more frequent basis. The fact that this case presents
72. 285 N.C. 452, 206 S.E.2d 242 (1974).
73. In re Boling, 13 Bankr. at 43.
74. Szabo Food Service, 285 N.C. at 461, 206 S.E.2d at 249.
75. UCC § 1-201 (37), Official Comment (37) (1988).
76. Szabo Food Service, 285 N.C. at 459-60, 206 S.E.2d at 248.
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an unusual set of facts should not weaken this conclusion.77
Actually, the appellate courts in North Carolina have had several ad-
ditional opportunities to discuss the sale/lease distinction. In Borg-
Warner Acceptance Corp. v. David,78 the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals was faced with a civil action brought by a personal property lessor
to recover certain equipment subject to a lease. The lessee claimed that
the contract was actually a security agreement. In a short opinion in
which the court made no mention of North Carolina General Statute
section 25-1-201 (37), the court held that the agreement was a lease
based on a number of factors. These factors included, inter alia, the
designation of the agreement as a lease "on its face," title retention in the
lessor, lessee's agreement to repair and maintain the property, and,
''more importantly," the inability to renew the lease or purchase the
property under the agreement.79 The facts of this case were very easy to
apply and it was unnecessary to review North Carolina General Statute
section 25-1-201 (37); however, if the facts had been any more intricate,
amended section 1-201 (37) would have provided more guidelines for the
Court of Appeals without changing the outcome of this simple case
whatsoever.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has had one other opportunity
to review the sale/lease issue. In NYTCO Leasing, Inc. v. Dan-Cleve
Corp. , o the lessee of motel furniture, equipment and fixtures claimed
that the "purported 'lease agreement' executed by the parties [was] in
reality a conditional sale contract.""s While rejecting this argument, but
without citing North Carolina General Statute section 25-1-201 (37), the
court took note of several facts:
Not only does the document contain all indicia of a lease, a provision that
the property would be returned to plaintiff [lessor] at the expiration of
77. Near the beginning of their discussion of this case, the court premised their argument with
the following comment:
At the outset we note that the purpose of this action is to determine which of two parties to a
purported lease agreement is required by the taxing statute to list the equipment in the demised
premises for taxation. This is not a suit brought by lessor-creditor under the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code (G.S. 25-1-10let seq.) ... to enforce against the lessee-debtor, or
one claiming through him, a security interest in property which the debtor holds under an
alleged security agreement.
285 N.C. at 458, 206 S.E.2d at 247. This comment may be seen as weakening any holding the court
may have in regard to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-201 (37). However, two points can be used to refute
this contention. First, the court extensively discussed and applied the rules from section 25-1-201
(37). The court would not fully review this statute unless they wanted their argument to carry some
weight. Second, when Bankruptcy Judge Bare was faced with a true sale/lease distinction issue, he
thought the North Carolina Supreme Court's discussion was worthy of citation. Boling, 13 Bankr. at
43.
78. 32 N.C. App. 559, 232 S.E.2d 867, disc. rev. denied, 292 N.C. 640, 235 S.E.2d 61 (1977).
79. 32 at 561, 232 S.E.2d at 869.
80. 31 N.C. App. 634, 230 S.E.2d 559 (1976), disc. rev. denied, 292 N.C. 265, 233 S.E.2d 393
(1977).
81. Id. at 639, 230 S.E.2d at 562.
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the lease period, but the record also shows that plaintiff was not engaged
in manufacturing or selling the property in question but, pursuant to a
list furnished by defendants, went into the market place and purchased
the property for the defendants.8 2
These facts led the court to the conclusion that the document was a true
lease rather than a conditional sale contract. Again, like the decision in
Borg- Warner, the Court of Appeals did not face a very tough factual
scenario and the extensive guidelines of amended section 1-201 (37)
could have only aided the court in their determination.
However, the Court of Appeals in Borg- Warner did apply one of the
factors from Brookside Drug Store. The Court of Appeals found it im-
portant that the lessor purchased this property specifically for the
lessee.8 3 This factor should not be used to distinguish a sale from a lease.
As discussed hereinabove, the court should not penalize lessors for being
prudent investors and for choosing the option to lease rather than the
option to sell.8 4 This shows the beginning of a "laundry list" in North
Carolina; therefore, the seemingly simple conclusion in Borg-Warner
should not trick the General Assembly to believe that amended section 1-
201 (37) is unnecessary.
Despite the easy conclusions in Borg- Warner and NYTCO Leasing, the
General Assembly should still consider amending North Carolina Gen-
eral Statute section 25-1-201 (37) and adopting Article 2A. Under
amended section 1-201 (37), the easy cases are not made more compli-
cated and the hard cases are made much easier to resolve. Presently,
North Carolina General Statute section 25-1-201 (37) is "vague and out-
moded."8 5 Specifically, the reliance upon the parties' intent as a standard
of determination will not provide the proper guidelines that the courts in
North Carolina will need in the future. The best way to prevent these
problems, as well as adopt a comprehensive and scholarly set of rules
regarding personal property leases, is to enact Article 2A and amended
section 1-201 (37).
V. CONCLUSION - ARTICLE 2A AND AMENDED §§ 1-201 (37)
SHOULD BE ADOPTED
Article 2A and amended section 1-201 (37) represent an excellent
transition into the modem business world. By focusing on the intent of
the parties, the judicial system was effectively closing the door on a new
and innovative way to structure personal property business deals. The
General Assembly of North Carolina should reopen that door and allow
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Part II(B)(6) hereinabove and the text accompanying notes.
85. UCC § 1-201 (37) official comment (37) (1988).
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a very progressive form of business deal, the personal property leasing
transaction, to push forward into the 21st century. By continually hold-
ing that personal property leases are security interests, the courts are
scaring away the lessors of the future. If the lessors must worry about
losing the property they actually "intended" to lease, they will stop using
the personal property lease and thereby destroy some innovative business
deals before they start.
Article 2A and amended section 1-201 (37) provide some appropriate
guidelines for the future development of personal property leasing law.
The state of North Carolina will be hindering its business community by
not considering these statutes as soon as possible. In the words of Ame-
lia Boss:
Admittedly, Article 2A [and amended section 1-201 (37) are] not per-
fect, but there is little in this world that is perfect. Indeed, it is doubtful
whether more years of study, reflection, and revision would result in any-
thing substantially better. As the California Bar Report concluded, "it is
a good statute, a desirable alternative to the existing state of affairs," and
as such should be adopted.
86
Edwin Huddleson had a similar view:
Though the statute is by no means perfect, it marshals an impressive
array of benefits and improvements over existing law for the equipment
leasing industry. The statute clarifies the difference between a true lease
and a "security interest." Moreover, it provides clarity and uniformity in
state law, particularly in the troublesome areas of warranties and lessors'
remedies. UCC filings are not required for leased equipment, although
lessors who filed in the past probably will want to continue to do so.
New "fixture filings" in real estate records will protect lessors of fixtures.
The statute also improves the position of unfiled lessors of "readily re-
movable" fixtures in priority disputes with competing real estate inter-
ests. The old "vendor-in-possession" doctrine is abolished for sales-
leasebacks. The modest "consumer lease" provisions in the statute
largely mirror existing law.
87
With all these advantages, there is no reason the General Assembly of
North Carolina should not immediately push for the adoption of Article
2A and amended section 1-201 (37) in the near future. In the very least,
the adoption of amended section 1-201 (37) would eliminate the poten-
tial "laundry lists" and "unfortunate results" that have become the norm
in other jurisdictions.
BRENT WOOD*
86. Boss, supra note 1, at 147 (citing Preliminary Draft Report of the Uniform Commercial
Code Committee of the Business Law Section of the State Bar of California on Proposed California
Commercial Code Division 10 (ARTICLE 2A) (May 18, 1987), p. 5 (emphasis by Boss)).
87. HUDDLESON, supra note 7, at 681 (emphasis added).
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